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A long tradition of psychological research has explored the distinction between char-
acteristics that are part of the self and those that lie outside of it. Recently, a surge
of research has begun examining a further distinction. Even among characteristics
that are internal to the self, people pick out a subset as belonging to the true self. These
factors are judged as making people who they really are, deep down. In this paper, we
introduce the concept of the true self and identify features that distinguish people’s
understanding of the true self from their understanding of the self more generally. In
particular, we consider recent findings that the true self is perceived as positive and
moral, and that this tendency is actor-observer invariant and cross-culturally stable.
We then explore possible explanations for these findings and discuss their implica-
tions for a variety of issues in psychology.
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If you open The Handbook of Social Psychology and flip
to the index, you’ll find that there are more than 60 sep-
arate entries listed under self—and that’s not including
the sub-entries (S. T. Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010).
This is more than any other word in the index, aside
from social (as in “social psychology”). The nature of
the self is at the heart of psychology, driving many of
its most urgent and profound questions.
Because this literature is so vast, the self can be con-
ceptualized in many different ways. One popular way
is to define the self in contrast with the environment
that surrounds it. As Gilbert and Malone (1995) poeti-
cally put it,
“the human skin [is seen] as a special
boundary that separates one set of ’causal
forces’ from another. On the sunny side of
the epidermis are the external or situational
forces that press inward on the person, and
on the meaty side are the internal or per-
sonal forces that exert pressure outward.”
The authors would like to thank Rebecca Schlegel, Dan
Bartels, Roy Baumeister, Sarah Molouki, Kerry McKenzie,
Jesse Summers, and Jesse Chandler for helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this manuscript.
(p. 21)
This epidermis-centric view captures something of
what it means to be a self. It is useful for determin-
ing whether, for instance, we are touching Nina’s leg or
her bedsheets, and whether that object in the distance
is our date or some shrubbery. Indeed, this tradition
has uncovered a spate of classic and important effects
in social psychology (e.g. Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones &
Nisbett, 1971; Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
But as productive as this distinction has been, recent
research suggests that people have another, quite dif-
ferent, way of thinking about the self. Even among
characteristics that clearly lie ’inside the skin,’ people
further differentiate between features that are part of
the “true self” and those that fall outside it. This dis-
tinction appears to have implications for a variety of
psychological phenomena.
Our aim is to provide an overview of the emerging
literature on the true self concept and show why it is
critical to draw a distinction between the self and the
true self, both for theory and practice.
The features of the true self
The self contains multitudes: it is a body and amind,
organs and thoughts, desires and intentions, whims
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and dispositions. Are all parts of the self equally self-
like, or are certain parts especially essential?
A close examination of certain cases illustrates how
the self concept, as a whole, differs from the true self.
Consider the musical Grease, where Sandy sheds her
goody-goody persona to become a leather-clad, pelvis-
thrusting bad girl. Surely all this smokiness and gyra-
tion is Sandy. But just as surely, this is a performance
designed to gain the approval of her peers, not the ’real’
Sandy. Or witness Ebenezer Scrooge, who transforms
from crotchetymiser to joyful humanitarian inAChrist-
mas Carol. Although both instantiations of Scrooge are
Scrooge, readers are drawn to the conclusion that the
latter Scrooge has discovered his true nature.
Less fancifully, we can reflect on real-life cases of in-
ner conflict. When an addict experiences conflict about
whether to stay sober or use drugs, both of these op-
posing desires occur within the self, but people tend to
believe that one of these desires is more authentic than
the other (Frankfurt, 1988; Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999).
A similar conflict arises for conservative gay Chris-
tians, who are torn between homosexual impulses and
the conviction that homosexuality is a sin (Newman,
Knobe, & Bloom, 2014). Simply recognizing that both
desires are part of the self is not fine-grained enough
to capture the intuition that only a subset of desires be-
long to the true self.
The notion that some parts of the self are more au-
thentic than others crops up frequently in psycholog-
ical research, albeit under a slew of guises. Some-
times it is called the real self (Rogers, 1961; Turner,
1976; Masterson, 1988; Koole & Kuhl, 2003; Sloan,
2007), the ideal self (Chodorkoff, 1954; D. T. Kenny,
1956; Higgins, 1987), the authentic self (Johnson &
Boyd, 1995; Cable, Gino, & Staats, 2013), the intrinsic
self (Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001;
Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002), the
essential self (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014), or the
deep self (Sripada, 2010).
However, a consensus is emerging over the term
“true self”, which we adopt here (Sheldon, Ryan, Raw-
sthorne, & Ilardi, 1997; Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons,
2002; Johnson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 2004; Schlegel,
Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009; Newman, Lockhart, & Keil,
2010; Landau et al., 2011). While the inverse of true
self is sometimes presented as “false self" (Harter, 2002;
Johnson et al., 2004), the negation of true self as we in-
tend it is a superficial or peripheral self—that is, aspects
of the self that are inessential to who someone really
is. The true self refers both to something we see in our
own selves and in other people.
Historically, the true self concept has figured into
psychological research in two rather different ways.
Because the true self is a commonly-held belief
amongst ordinary people, the bulk of scholarship has
focused on describing how these beliefs work, and ex-
plicating their role in social behavior and cognition.
But a subset of researchers make a bolder claim: the
true self really does exist (Maslow, 1943; Rogers, 1961;
Bem, 1973; Masterson, 1988; Koole & Kuhl, 2003; Ker-
nis & Goldman, 2006). Carl Rogers, an influential pro-
ponent of this view, asserts that the true self lurks be-
neath the individual’s “false front”; it is only “when [a
person] fully experiences the feelings which at an or-
ganic level he is... that he is being a part of his real
self” (Rogers, 1961, p. 111, emphasis original). (Not ev-
eryone agrees; Foucault’s charmingly derisive term for
Rogers and his ilk is “the Californian cult of the self”;
1983, p. 245.) Although in this paper we will treat the
true self as a phenomenon of folk understanding, no
doubt many readers will be wondering how these re-
sults bear on the ontological status of the true self. We
will return to this question at the end of the paper.
Now that we have demarcated the pasture of the self
landscape belonging to the true self, we can begin to
chart its features. It may be helpful to consider the true
self in contrast with the features that are commonly
granted to the self (Table 1).
The true self is moral
Awell-established finding within cognitive psychol-
ogy is that changing the central features of a concept al-
ters its identity more than changing its peripheral fea-
tures (Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998). Thus, one way
of discovering what the true self consists of is to test
what kinds of changes to the self alter a person’s iden-
tity themost. Broadly speaking, one’s mind contributes
to personal identity more than one’s body (Blok, New-
man, Behr, & Rips, 2001; Nichols & Bruno, 2010). But
when psychological characteristics are pitted directly
against one another (e.g. perception, memories, pref-
erences, personality), people report the greatest iden-
tity discontinuity when moral capacities have been al-
tered or removed (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; Prinz
& Nichols, in press). This pattern is quite robust. It
shows up regardless of the source of change (the aging
process, medical interventions, supernatural events),
and regardless of the type of moral feature (disposition,
behavior, or belief) (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young,
in press; Molouki & Bartels, in press). Moral traits are
considered to be the most deeply rooted, causally cen-
tral aspect of a person’s identity (Chen, Urminsky, &
Bartels, in press)., which may help explain why people
are unwilling to take psychopharmaceuticals that ad-
dress moral deficits (Riis, Simmons, & Goodwin, 2008).
The privileging of moral traits within the self has
THE TRUE SELF 3
Table 1
A comparison of key differences between the true self and the self more generally.
THE SELF THE TRUE SELF
Encompasses entire range of personal features Emphasizes moral features
Valence-independent; can be positive or negative Valence-dependent; positive by default
Perspective (first- or third-person) dependent Perspective-independent
Cross-culturally variable Cross-culturally stable
also been observed in real cases of neurological change.
Patients with frontotemporal dementia—a disease that
primarily disrupts moral capacities—are seen by loved
ones as having changed more “deep down" than pa-
tients with diseases that primarily impact memory
(Alzheimer’s) or motor function (amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis). Even in neurodegenerative diseases that pri-
marily impact other parts of the mind, the extent to
which patients are perceived as essentially the same
person is almost entirely predicted by whether their
moral capacities have been preserved (Strohminger &
Nichols, 2015).
The dominance of moral traits in personal identity
appears to extend to impression formation as well.
While it has long been recognized that warmth matters
more than competence in forming impressions of oth-
ers (Anderson, 1968; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski,
1998), more recently it has been discovered that moral-
ity plays a larger role than either (Brambilla, Rusconi,
Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin,
2014; Goodwin, 2015). This commonality suggests is a
deeper level at which people perceive others: not just
as a loose conglomeration of personality traits, but also,
and perhaps especially, in terms of their underlying
moral selves.
This is not to say that the true self only comprises
moral features. People also attribute emotions, desires,
and hidden mental states to the true self (Andersen
& Ross, 1984; Bench, Schlegel, Davis, & Vess, 2015).
Nonetheless, current research suggests that moral fea-
tures play a uniquely constitutive role.
The true self is good
The true self is not just perceived as moral, but as
good. Moral improvement leads to less perceived per-
sonal identity discontinuity than moral deterioration
(Tobia, 2016; Molouki & Bartels, in press). Generally
speaking, positive personal changes are seen as discov-
eries. That is, they are not seen as a form of change
at all, but as revealing what was always hidden deep
inside (Bench et al., 2015). This may explain why the
feeling of knowingwho someone really is deep down is
strongest when subjects are given both moral and posi-
tive information about a target (Christy, Kim, Schlegel,
Vess, & Hicks, 2016). It may also explain why mental
illness is often portrayed in clinical psychology as ’cov-
ering up’ the real self (Masterson, 1988).
This view of the true self as an underlying, and po-
tentially invisible, aspect of the self is bolstered by re-
search on psychological essentialism. Positive, desir-
able personality traits are more essentialized than neg-
ative, undesirable traits, and essentialized traits are in
turn seen as more central to defining to who some-
one is (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). Adults and
children share the intuition that a person’s traits will
tend to improve over time, indicating an implicit be-
lief that, regardless of its current surface features, the
true self’s positive nature will eventually shine through
(Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002; Molouki & Bartels, in
press). Importantly, converging evidence now suggests
that there is an independent contribution of positive
valence: the more positive a trait is—moral or not—the
more likely it is seen as part of the true self (e.g. Bench
et al., 2015; Molouki & Bartels, in press; Tobia, 2016;
Christy, Kim, et al., 2016).
The importance of positive valence to the true self
becomes even clearer in studies where subjects must
choose whether features belong to the true self or the
surface self. When asked which part of the self is re-
sponsible for a person becoming bad (e.g. a deadbeat
dad), subjects attribute this change to the surface self,
but becoming a better person (e.g. a loving father)
is attributed to the true self (compare this finding to
Scrooge’s transformation; Newman, Knobe, & Bloom,
2014). This effect is contingent on the values of the per-
son rendering the judgment: liberals think homosexual
urges are part of the true self, but conservatives think it
is not (Newman, Knobe, & Bloom, 2014). And though
there is a tendency to consider feelings to be more self-
like than cooler cognitive states (Haslam et al., 2004;
Johnson et al., 2004), whether feelings or beliefs are con-
sidered part of the true self depends on whether they
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are good (Newman, Knobe, & Bloom, 2014).
Even misanthropes and pessimists believe that the
true self is good (De Freitas et al., 2016). To date, the
only manipulation that has been able to eliminate this
tendency is one in which participants are explicitly told
that an agent has a morally bad true self (Newman,
De Freitas, & Knobe, 2014). Even then, participants’
tendency to see the agent’s true self as morally bad is
not as strong as the tendency to see the true self as
morally good when participants are given no instruc-
tion at all. Though we are perfectly willing to conceive
of other people as bad, we are unwilling to see them as
bad deep down.
Taken together, these findings demonstrate an im-
portant respect in which people’s understanding of the
true self is different from their understanding of the
self. People are happy to regard morally bad motives
as internal to a person (e.g. S. T. Fiske, 1980; Wojciszke,
Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993), but they are nonetheless re-
luctant to regard suchmotives as elements of a person’s
true self. Existing studies point to a strong tendency for
people to see such motives as external to the true self
and to conclude that the true self is calling the person
to do what is morally right.
The true self is perspective-independent
One of the most ubiquitous findings in social psy-
chology is that the assessments people make for them-
selves differ from the assessments they render unto
others. When judging others, negative information is
more salient and powerful than positive information
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Our impressions of others
are not simply the sum of all good and bad traits, as
negative traits are weighted more heavily (S. T. Fiske,
1980; Wojciszke et al., 1993). Less evidence is required
to designate someone a sinner than a saint, and rel-
atively small amounts of sinning can relegate one to
the sinner category (Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Klein &
O’Brien, in press). People are, indeed, all too eager to
attribute the unsavory behaviors of the people around
them to internal causes, even when these behaviors can
be clearly traced to random, situational causes (Jones &
Harris, 1967; Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
When people judge themselves, this pattern re-
verses. People routinely overestimate their own knowl-
edge and abilities (Gilovich, 1991; West & Stanovich,
1997; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002)
and downplay the role of situational factors when ac-
counting for their own accomplishments (Jones & Nis-
bett, 1971; Malle, 2006). This self-serving bias leads
people to deem themselves superior to others in virtu-
ally every testable way— more virtuous, more skilled,
more rational, more unique (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986;
Falk, 1989; Kenworthy & Miller, 2002; Klein & Epley,
2016). Naturally, people also believe themselves to be
less prone to cognitive biases than the average schmo
(Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross,
2004). Note, however, that the bulk of research compar-
ing own–other attributions has been concerned with
the “self” at a general level.
When subjects are instead asked about the true self,
no such actor-observer asymmetry emerges. People re-
gard their own true selves as good (Bench et al., 2015;
Molouki & Bartels, in press), but they also consider the
true selves of others to be fundamentally good (Bench
et al., 2015; Newman, Knobe, & Bloom, 2014) andmoral
(Heiphetz et al., in press). Unlike more global assess-
ments of the self, the true self is painted in flattering
colors whether one is looking inward, at one’s own
self, or outward, to others. There may well be ex-
ceptions at the individual level—perhaps psychopaths
seem deeply flawed only to observers, and vice versa
for the clinically depressed. There also seem to be some
perspective-based differences in the kinds of content
attributed to the true self, with people believing that
experiences best reflect their own true selves, whereas
general dispositions best reflect others’ (Johnson &
Boyd, 1995). Nonetheless, perspective-independence
in valence is the pattern that obtains at the population
level.
It is worth emphasizing just how striking this dis-
crepancy is. One of the most ubiquitous effects in the
self literature—actor-observer valence asymmetry—
fails to obtain for true self attribution. This regularity
gives us a hint about the process underlying true self
attribution, which we shall return to shortly.
The true self is cross-culturally stable
A large body of work has been devoted to how con-
ceptions of the self differ cross-culturally. In very broad
strokes, Westerners understand the self in terms of the
individual (independence), whereas Easterners under-
stand the self more in terms of social relationships (in-
terdependence; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Because of such differences in the way the self is
conceptualized across Eastern and Western cultures,
it seems natural to expect differences in the true self.
However, the true self concept is remarkably cross-
culturally robust. Like Westerners, people from a
range of interdependent cultures (Russia, Singapore,
and Colombia) hold the belief that the true self is
normatively good (De Freitas et al., 2016). Simi-
larly, Americans and Japanese believe that negative
traits (such as being unkind or having bad vision) will
tend ’correct themselves’ over time, belying an im-
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plicit belief that the positive trait represents the per-
son’s deeper nature (Lockhart, Nakashima, Inagaki,
& Keil, 2008). The moral dimension of the true self
is also preserved cross-culturally: Hindu Indians and
Buddhist Tibetans consider moral features more cen-
tral to personal essence than any other psychological
trait (Nichols, Strohminger, Rai, & Garfield, 2016). This
finding is particularly striking given that Buddhist Ti-
betans explicitly deny the existence of the self (Garfield,
Nichols, Rai, & Strohminger, 2015).
Based on the available evidence, many of the key
features of the true self—that it is moral, good, and
perspective-independent—are culturally invariant. Of
course, the present account also predicts a specific kind
of cultural difference. In particular, when different cul-
tures have different views about what is morally good,
these different cultures should show correspondingly
different patterns of true self attributions. However,
this predicted cross-cultural difference would reveal a
similarity at a more abstract level. Different cultures
might have different views about which actions are
morally good, but they could be similar in believing
that the true self is calling us to morally good actions.
Directions for future research
Consequences of the true self concept
Thus far, we have been suggesting that it can be
helpful to distinguish between the way people under-
stand the self in general and way people understand
the true self in particular. We turn now to some pos-
sible downstream effects of this distinction. Some of
these effects have already been examined in existing re-
search, while others still remain to be explored.
Within research on well-being, studies show that
judgments about the true self have a special connection
to people’s sense of meaning in life. Numerous stud-
ies have shown that people generally hold positive atti-
tudes about the self (e.g. Gilovich, 1991; Kruger &Dun-
ning, 1999); however, the effect on people’s sense of
meaning in life is specific to attitudes about the true self
(Schlegel et al., 2009; Schlegel, Hicks, King, & Arndt,
2011). Suppose that a person has a desire to make a lot
of money and also a desire to create a beautiful work
of art. This person may see both desires as aspects of
her self, but to the extent that she sees only the latter
as falling within her true self, the satisfaction of this
latter desire will contribute to her sense of meaning in
life in a way that the satisfaction of the former will not.
Research has also found a distinctive impact of true
self beliefs on a number of other outcomes, including
satisfaction with life decisions (Schlegel, Hicks, Davis,
Hirsch, & Smith, 2013; Kim, Christy, Hicks, & Schlegel,
2016), feelings of defensiveness (Schimel et al., 2001),
and motivation and well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Within clinical research, the distinction between self
and true self may shed light on the reluctance people
show to pursue courses of action that would lead to
changes in the self. Work by Riis and colleagues (2008)
found that people were reluctant to use psychopharma-
ceuticals to enhance aspects of the self that were seen as
lying at the core of their identities (e.g. empathy, kind-
ness, mood), but they were perfectly willing to adopt
the same approach to enhancing aspects of the self that
were seen as peripheral to their identities (e.g. concen-
tration, memory). Future studies could ask whether
this same effect arises for other treatment modalities.
For example, people with clinical depression and anxi-
ety disorders are often reluctant to seek treatment, even
when the treatment in question is talk therapy (Kohn,
Saxena, Levav, & Saraceno, 2004; Ilse van Beljouw et
al., 2010; Mojtabai et al., 2011; Nyholm & O’Neill, in
press). This reluctance may arise in part because peo-
ple see their emotional state as an expression of their
true selves (Kramer, 1993).
Within moral cognition, existing research finds an
asymmetry in people’s judgments about blame versus
praise for actions that were driven by overwhelming,
irresistible emotion. Agents receive decreased blame
for morally bad actions when overcome by emotion,
but they do not receive decreased praise for morally
good actions when overcome by emotion (Pizarro,
Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). Incorporating the true self
concept can provide a straightforward explanation of
this effect. Although emotion is seen as part of the
self in both cases, people should be inclined to see it
as falling outside the true self in the morally bad case
(leading to decreased blame) but as falling inside the
true self in the morally good case (leading to no de-
crease in praise). Recent studies find support for this
explanation using both mediation and manipulation
(Newman, De Freitas, & Knobe, 2014). Moreover, sub-
sequent work suggests that intuitions about the true
self might also explain a variety of other patterns in
blame judgments, including the tendency to decrease
blame in cases where the agent had a bad upbringing
(Faraci & Shoemaker, 2016) or mental illness (Daigle
& Demaree-Cotton, 2016), or in cases where a large
amount of time has elapsed (Mott, 2016).
Within the study of relationships, extant work shows
that people employ different norms depending on the
type of relationship they are in (A. P. Fiske, 1992; Clark
& Aragon, 2013). For instance, paying for services is
appropriate in the context of a market pricing relation-
ship, but it would be in poor taste for a friendship. Per-
haps one such difference is that people are inclined to
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think about the true self in certain kinds of relation-
ships (e.g. romantic) but are less likely to consider
the true self in others (e.g. exchange-based relation-
ships). If this hypothesis turns out to be correct, it could
help explain the well-documented bias wherein peo-
ple to evaluate their romantic partners less accurately,
and more favorably, than strangers do (D. A. Kenny &
Acitelli, 2001; Gagné & Lydon, 2004; Geher et al., 2005).
Under this view, people in romantic relationships do
not simply arrive at different answers; they are ask-
ing fundamentally different questions. While people
in most relationships aim to understand the entirety of
the person’s traits, it might be that people in romantic
relationships focus especially on describing their part-
ner’s true self.
Finally, the distinction may help in understanding
how to alleviate intergroup conflict. Intergroup con-
flict is often fueled by attributions involving the self
(Pettigrew, 1979; Hewstone, 1990). Conflicts between
groups arise and are intensified by differential atti-
tudes that outgroup members take toward political is-
sues, controversial moral questions, musical and fash-
ion choices, even arbitrary group assignment (Allen &
Wilder, 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 1979/2001; Locksley, Or-
tiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Lonsdale & North, 2009). Emerg-
ing evidence suggests that such conflicts could be al-
leviated to the degree that people instead focus on out-
groupmembers’ true selves (De Freitas &Cikara, 2016).
While people might continue to acknowledge that the
outgroup members differ from themselves on a variety
of dimensions, reminding them that outgroup mem-
bers share a common features at a deeper level reduces
intergroup bias.
Is the true self always perceived as morally good?
Given how much variation there is in personal
traits—both among judgers and the judged—it may
come as a surprise that there is such uniformity in as-
sessments of the true self. People with predominantly
bad surface traits are generally considered to be good
deep down, just like people who have predominantly
good surface traits (Newman, Knobe, & Bloom, 2014).
Likewise, misanthropy and pessimism scores add no
predictive value to the tendency to attribute goodness
to others’ true selves (De Freitas et al., 2016). But, like
all good psychological generalizations, this one comes
with a few provisos.
First, there appear to be individual differences in the
attributes assigned to the true self. People with above
average psychopathy scores do not consider morality
to be the most important trait when judging the iden-
tity continuity of other people, and those very low in
psychopathy place an especially strong emphasis on
morality (Strohminger & Nichols, 2016). We might
expect other individual differences to yield variations
in the traits attributed to the true self, such as theory
of mind capabilities (viz. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) or autobiographical mem-
ory function (viz. Palombo, Williams, Abdi, & Levine,
2013).
The underlying rule that would explain such dif-
ferences is observers ascribe to the true self traits that
they themselves value. Psychopaths don’t value being
morally good, therefore changes to the moral features
do not register as fundamentally disruptive of identity.
Misanthropists still value being morally good, they just
have grown weary and skeptical. A cynic is a disap-
pointed idealist, but a psychopath is no idealist at all.
Second, although people have a strong tendency to
attribute morally good desires to the true self, people
will also attribute morally bad desires to the true self
under the right circumstances. For instance, a manwho
morally endorses same-sex couples but is nonetheless
repulsed by them is seen as fundamentally conflicted.
For many subjects, both his automatic reaction and
the principled belief are deemed part of his true self
(Newman, Knobe, & Bloom, 2014, Study 3). The exis-
tence of such cases indicates that people do not always
see the true self as a unitary phenomenon. Sometimes
they posit competing impulses within it.
Why are true self attributions this way?
Existing research suggests a striking convergence in
peoples true self attributions. Regardless of culture,
perspective or personality, people tend to see the true
self as morally good. Why is this the case? We see two
possible types of explanation, corresponding to the tra-
ditional distinction between “motivational” and “cog-
nitive” approaches (Kunda, 1990).
The first possibility is that the effects we have re-
viewed thus far can be explained in terms of motivated
cognition. At the core of the motivated cognition ap-
proach is the idea that people hold certain views be-
cause they experience an external need or desire to hold
those views. Numerous studies in other domains have
found motivational effects of this type (Jost, Banaji, &
Nosek, 2004; Kunda, 1990), and there is strong evi-
dence that motivated cognition plays an important role
in person perception (Kuzmanovic, Jefferson, Bente,
& Vogeley, 2013; Lemay Jr., 2014). Quite plausibly,
this same basic process is at work in true self attribu-
tions. Perhaps people believe that all human beings are
morally good deep down because there is an external
benefit to doing so, such as enhancing well-being or in-
terpersonal trust.
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An alternative possibility is that true self attribu-
tions arise as a result of more domain-general cognitive
processes. In support of this view, recent work finds
that a wide range of non-human entities are also seen
as essentially good. Nations, rock bands, universities,
scientific papers, and conferences are judged to retain
more of their identity when their features improve than
when they deteriorate (De Freitas, Tobia, Newman, &
Knobe, in press). It seems unlikely that people are mo-
tivated to believe that, deep down, all conferences are
good. Rather, this tendency suggests that value judg-
ments truly are playing a role in peoples reasoning.
One way to spell out this second possibility is that
judgments about the true self are a product of psycho-
logical essentialism (Barsalou, 1985; Keil, 1989; Lynch,
Coley, &Medin, 2000; Gelman, 2003; Bloom, 2004, 2010;
Newman & Keil, 2008). Consistent with this view, re-
cent studies show that beliefs about the true self are
characterized by telltale features of essentialist reason-
ing, such as immutability, informativeness, and inher-
ence (Christy, Schlegel, & Cimpian, 2016). The effects
we have been reviewing here might then be explained
in terms of more general facts about how psychological
essentialism works. For example, independent of how
people think of human beings, a growing body of evi-
dence suggests that people tend to see essences as good
(Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013; De Freitas et al., in
press). The propensity to see others as having a good
true self might then be explained in terms of this quite
general fact about the way people attribute essences.
One advantage of this view is it would explain the ab-
sence of a perspective effect. The shift between actor
and observer perspectives leads to a substantial differ-
ence in motivation, but it might have no effect at all on
the basic processes involved in essentialist reasoning.
One remaining puzzle is how to explain the find-
ing that people specifically see the true self as morally
good rather than good in some other way. The exact
reason for this is open at the moment. Previous work
shows that an object’s identity is related to its purpose
(Gelman & Bloom, 2000; Rose & Schaffer, in press). Per-
haps the same is true of people, with morality being
seen as the human telos. Another, non-mutually exclu-
sive, possibility is that moral traits are especially im-
portant because they are essential for the maintenance
of social bonds (Strohminger &Nichols, 2015; Heiphetz
et al., in press). Because humans are hyper-social crea-
tures, they may be keenly tuned to tracking the moral
features of the people around them.
While research shows that the true self is principally
moral, it also shows that many valued traits are as-
cribed to the true self (Bench et al., 2015). In American
culture, the idea that all of us have within us a trove
of hidden talents and abilities waiting to be exposed
looms large, and its popularity may be made possible
by the notion of the true self.
Coda: Does the true self exist?
In this paper, we have outlined the principal features
of a folk concept, and discussed the role it plays in var-
ious aspects of human thought and behavior. Readers
may now be curious about a deeper question. Is the
true self also a scientific concept, one that can be used
to describe how the mind actually works? Is there, in
other words, a true self?
The evidence reviewed here points to two properties
relevant to this question. One: the true self depends
on the values of the observer. If someone thinks homo-
sexual urges are wrong, she will say the desire to resist
such urges represents the true self (Newman, Knobe,
& Bloom, 2014). And if she scores high in psychopa-
thy, she will assign less weight to moral features in her
conceptualization of personal identity (Strohminger &
Nichols, 2016). What counts as part of the true self is
subjective, and strongly tied to what each individual
person herself most prizes.
Two: The true self is, shall we say, evidence-
insensitive. Resplendent as the true self is, it is also a
bashful thing. Yet people have little trouble imbuing it
with a host of hidden properties. Indeed, claims made
on its behalf may completely contradict all available
data, as when the hopelessly miserable and knavish are
nonetheless deemed good ’deep down’. The true self is
posited rather than observed. It is a hopeful phantasm.
These two features—radical subjectivity and
unverifiability—prevent the true self from being
scientific concept. The notion that there are especially
authentic parts of the self, and that these parts can
remain cloaked from view indefinitely, borders on the
superstitious. This is not to say that lay belief in a
true self is dysfunctional. Perhaps it is a useful fiction,
akin to certain phenomena in religious cognition and
decision-making (Boyer, 2001; Gigerenzer & Todd,
1999). But, in our view, it is a fiction nonetheless.
References
Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by
the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(6), 1621–1630.
Allen, V. L., & Wilder, D. A. (1975). Categorization, belief
similarity, and intergroup discrimination. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 32(6), 971–977.
Andersen, S. M., & Ross, L. (1984). Self-knowledge and so-
cial inference: The impact of cognitive/affective and be-
havioral data. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
46(2), 280–293.
8 NINA STROHMINGER
Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555
personality-trait words. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 9(3), 272–279.
Arndt, J., Schimel, J., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2002).
The intrinsic self and defensiveness: Evidence that activat-
ing the intrinsic self reduces self-handicapping and con-
formity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(5),
671–683.
Arpaly, N., & Schroeder, T. (1999). Praise, blame and the
whole self. Philosophical Studies, 93(2), 161–188.
Bargh, J. A., McKenna, K. Y., & Fitzsimons, G. M. (2002).
Can you see the real me? Activation and expression of
the “true self” on the internet. Journal of Social Issues, 58(1),
33–48.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb,
I. (2001). The “reading the mind in the eyes” test revised
version: A study with normal adults, and adults with As-
perger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(2), 241–251.
Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency, and fre-
quency of instantiation as determinants of graded struc-
ture in categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition, 11(4), 629–654.
Baumeister, R., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D.
(2001). Bad is stronger than good. Review of General Psy-
chology, 5(4), 323–370.
Bem, D. J. (1973). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. Vol. 6,
pp. 1–62). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Bench, S. W., Schlegel, R. J., Davis, W. E., & Vess, M. (2015).
Thinking about change in the self and others: The role of
self-discovery metaphors and the true self. Social Cogni-
tion, 33(3), 169–185.
Blok, S. V., Newman, G., Behr, J., & Rips, L. J. (2001). Infer-
ences about personal identity. In J. D. Moore &K. Stenning
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Cog-
nitive Science Society (pp. 80—85). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bloom, P. (2004). Descartes’ baby: How the science of child devel-
opment explains what makes us human. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Bloom, P. (2010). How pleasure works. New York, NY: W. W.
Norton.
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Brambilla, M., Rusconi, P., Sacchi, S., & Cherubini, P. (2011).
Looking for honesty: The primary role of morality (vs. so-
ciability and competence) in information gathering. Euro-
pean Journal of Social Psychology, 41(2), 135–143.
Brown, J. D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Self-
enhancement biases in social judgments. Social Cognition,
4(4), 353–376.
Cable, D. M., Gino, F., & Staats, B. R. (2013). Breaking them
in or eliciting their best? Reframing socialization around
newcomers’ authentic self-expression. Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly, 58(1), 1–36.
Chen, S. Y., Urminsky, O., & Bartels, D. M. (in press). Beliefs
about the causal structure of the self-concept determine
which changes disrupt personal identity. Psychological Sci-
ence.
Chodorkoff, B. (1954). Adjustment and the discrepancy be-
tween the perceived and ideal self. Journal of Clinical Psy-
chology, 10(3), 266–268.
Christy, A., Kim, J., Schlegel, R., Vess, M., & Hicks, J. (2016).
Do I know you? Moral information predicts perceived knowl-
edge of others’ true selves. (Unpublished manuscript.)
Christy, A., Schlegel, R., & Cimpian, A. (2016). Why do people
believe in true selves? The role of psychological essentialism.
(Unpublished manuscript.)
Clark, M. S., & Aragon, O. (2013). Communal (and other) re-
lationships: History, theory development, recent findings,
and future directions. In J. A. Simpson & L. Campbell
(Eds.), The oxford handbook of close relationships (pp. 255–
280). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Daigle, J., & Demaree-Cotton, J. (2016). One reason why norma-
tive competence theorists should avoid the case strategy. (Un-
published manuscript.)
De Freitas, J., & Cikara, M. (2016). Deep downmy enemy is good:
Thinking about the true self reduces intergroup bias. (Unpub-
lished manuscript.)
De Freitas, J., Sarkissian, H., Grossman, I., De Brigard, F.,
Luco, A., Newman, G., & Knobe, J. (2016). Is there universal
belief in a good true self? (Unpublished manuscript.)
De Freitas, J., Tobia, K., Newman, G., & Knobe, J. (in press).
The good ship Theseus: The effect of valence on object
identity judgments. Cognitive Science.
Falk, R. (1989). Judgment of coincidences: Mine versus yours.
The American Journal of Psychology, 102(4), 477–493.
Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2016). Good selves, true selves.
(Unpublished manuscript.)
Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality:
Framework for a unified theory of social relations. Psycho-
logical Review, 99(4), 689–723.
Fiske, S. T. (1980). Attention andweight in person perception:
The impact of negative and extreme behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 38(6), 889–906.
Fiske, S. T., Gilbert, D. T., & Lindzey, G. (2010). Handbook of
social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 2). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley
& Sons.
Foucault, M. (1983). On the genealogy of ethics: An overview
of work in progress. In H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.),
Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (2nd
ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988). Freedom of the will and the concept of a
person. New York, NY: Springer.
Gagné, F. M., & Lydon, J. E. (2004). Bias and accuracy in close
relationships: An integrative review. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 8(4), 322–338.
Garfield, J. L., Nichols, S., Rai, A. K., & Strohminger, N.
(2015). Ego, egoism and the impact of religion on ethi-
cal experience: What a paradoxical consequence of bud-
dhist culture tells us about moral psychology. The Journal
of Ethics, 19(3-4), 293–304.
Geher, G., Bloodworth, R., Mason, J., Stoaks, C., Downey,
H. J., Renstrom, K. L., & Romero, J. F. (2005). Motivational
underpinnings of romantic partner perceptions: Psycho-
THE TRUE SELF 9
logical and physiological evidence. Journal of Social and
Personal Relationships, 22(2), 255–281.
Gelman, S. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in
everyday thought. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Gelman, S., & Bloom, P. (2000). Young children are sensitive
to how an object was created when deciding what to name
it. Cognition, 76(2), 91–103.
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that
make us smart. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence
bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 21–38.
Gilovich, T. (1991). How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of
human reason in everyday life. New York, NY: Free Press.
Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Moral character in person perception.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(1), 38–44.
Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014). Moral char-
acter predominates in person perception and evaluation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(1), 148–168.
Harter, S. (2002). Authenticity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez
(Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 382–394). New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Haslam, N., Bastian, B., & Bissett, M. (2004). Essentialist be-
liefs about personality and their implications. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1661.
Heiphetz, L., Strohminger, N., & Young, L. (in press). The
role of moral beliefs, memories, and preferences in repre-
sentations of identity. Cognitive Science.
Hewstone, M. (1990). The ’ultimate attribution error’? A
review of the literature on intergroup causal attribution.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 20(4), 311–335.
Higgins, E. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self
and affect. Psychological Review, 94(3), 319–340.
Ilse van Beljouw, M. S. B., Verhaak, P., Prins, M., Cuijpers, P.,
Penninx, B., Bensing, J., et al. (2010). Reasons and deter-
minants for not receiving treatment for common mental
disorders. Psychiatric Services, 61(3), 250–257.
Johnson, J. T., & Boyd, K. R. (1995). Dispositional traits ver-
sus the content of experience: Actor/observer differences
in judgments of the "authentic self". Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 21(4), 375–383.
Johnson, J. T., Robinson, M. D., & Mitchell, E. B. (2004). Infer-
ences about the authentic self: When do actions say more
thanmental states? Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 87(5), 615.
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of atti-
tudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3(1), 1–24.
Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1971). The actor and the ob-
server: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior.
In E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. Kelley, R. Nisbett, S. Valins, &
B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behav-
ior (pp. 79–94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade
of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of
conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo.
Political Psychology, 25(6), 881–919.
Keil, F. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kenny, D. A., & Acitelli, L. K. (2001). Accuracy and bias in the
perception of the partner in a close relationship. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 80(3), 439–448.
Kenny, D. T. (1956). The influence of social desirability on dis-
crepancy measures between real self and ideal self. Journal
of Consulting Psychology, 20(4), 315–318.
Kenworthy, J. B., & Miller, N. (2002). Attributional biases
about the origins of attitudes: Externality, emotionality
and rationality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
82(5), 693–707.
Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent
conceptualization of authenticity: Theory and research. In
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 38, pp. 283–357). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Kim, J., Christy, A., Hicks, J. A., & Schlegel, R. J. (2016). Trust
thyself: True-Self-as-Guide lay theories enhance decision satis-
faction. (Unpublished manuscript.)
Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2016). Maybe holier, but definitely less
evil, than you: Bounded self-righteousness in social judg-
ment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110(5),
660–674.
Klein, N., & O’Brien, E. (in press). The tipping point of moral
change: When do good and bad acts make good and bad
actors? Social Cognition.
Knobe, J., Prasada, S., & Newman, G. (2013). Dual charac-
ter concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual
representation. Cognition, 127(2), 242–257.
Kohn, R., Saxena, S., Levav, I., & Saraceno, B. (2004). The
treatment gap in mental health care. Bulletin of the World
Health Organization, 82(11), 858–866.
Koole, S. L., & Kuhl, J. (2003). In search of the real self: A
functional perspective on optimal self-esteem and authen-
ticity. Psychological Inquiry, 14(1), 43–48.
Kramer, P. (1993). Listening to Prozac. New York, NY: Viking.
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it:
How difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence
lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121–1134.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498.
Kuzmanovic, B., Jefferson, A., Bente, G., & Vogeley, K. (2013).
Affective and motivational influences in person percep-
tion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 266.
Landau, M. J., Vess, M., Arndt, J., Rothschild, Z. K., Sulli-
van, D., & Atchley, R. A. (2011). Embodied metaphor and
the true self: Priming entity expansion and protection in-
fluences intrinsic self-expressions in self-perceptions and
interpersonal behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 47(1), 79–87.
Lemay Jr., E. P. (2014). Accuracy and bias in self-perceptions
of responsive behavior: Implications for security in ro-
mantic relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 107(4), 638–656.
Lockhart, K. L., Chang, B., & Story, T. (2002). Young children’s
beliefs about the stability of traits: Protective optimism?
Child Development, 73(5), 1408–1430.
Lockhart, K. L., Nakashima, N., Inagaki, K., & Keil, F. C.
(2008). From ugly duckling to swan?: Japanese and amer-
10 NINA STROHMINGER
ican beliefs about the stability and origins of traits. Cogni-
tive Development, 23(1), 155–179.
Locksley, A., Ortiz, V., & Hepburn, C. (1980). Social catego-
rization and discriminatory behavior: Extinguishing the
minimal intergroup discrimination effect. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 773–783.
Lonsdale, A. J., & North, A. C. (2009). Musical taste and in-
group favouritism. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,
12(3), 319–327.
Lynch, E. B., Coley, J. D., &Medin, D. L. (2000). Tall is typical:
Central tendency, ideal dimensions, and graded category
structure among tree experts and novices. Memory & Cog-
nition, 28(1), 41–50.
Malle, B. F. (2006). The actor-observer asymmetry in attribu-
tion: A (surprising) meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
132(6), 895–919.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self:
Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psy-
chological Review, 98(2), 224–253.
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psy-
chological Review, 50(4), 370–396.
Masterson, J. F. (1988). The real self: A developmental, self and
object relations approach. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Mojtabai, R., Olfson, M., Sampson, N. A., Jin, R., Druss, B.,
Wang, P. S., . . . Kessler, R. C. (2011). Barriers to men-
tal health treatment: Results from the National Comorbid-
ity Survey Replication. Psychological Medicine, 41(8), 1751–
1761.
Molouki, S., & Bartels, D. M. (in press). Personal change and
the continuity of identity. Cognitive Psychology.
Mott, C. (2016). Statutes of limitations and personal identity.
(Unpublished manuscript.)
Newman, G., De Freitas, J., & Knobe, J. (2014). Beliefs about
the true self explain asymmetries based on moral judg-
ment. Cognitive Science, 39(1), 96–125.
Newman, G., & Keil, F. C. (2008). Where is the essence?
Developmental shifts in children’s beliefs about internal
features. Child development, 79(5), 1344–1356.
Newman, G., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2014). Value judgments
and the true self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
40(2), 203–216.
Newman, G., Lockhart, K. L., & Keil, F. C. (2010). S¸end-
of-lifeTˇ biases in moral evaluations of others. Cognition,
115(2), 343–349.
Nichols, S., & Bruno, M. (2010). Intuitions about personal
identity: An empirical study. Philosophical Psychology,
23(3), 293–312.
Nichols, S., Strohminger, N., Rai, A. K., & Garfield, J. L.
(2016). Death and the self. (Unpublished manuscript.)
Nyholm, S., & O’Neill, E. (in press). Deep brain stimulation,
continuity over time, and the true self. Cambridge Quarterly
of Healthcare Ethics.
Palombo, D. J., Williams, L. J., Abdi, H., & Levine, B. (2013).
The survey of autobiographical memory (sam): A novel
measure of trait mnemonics in everyday life. Cortex, 49(6),
1526–1540.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1979). The ultimate attribution error: Extend-
ing Allport’s cognitive analysis of prejudice. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5(4), 461–476.
Pizarro, D., Uhlmann, E., & Salovey, P. (2003). Asymmetry in
judgments of moral blame and praise the role of perceived
metadesires. Psychological Science, 14(3), 267–272.
Prinz, J., & Nichols, S. (in press). Diachronic identity and
the moral self. In J. Kiverstein (Ed.), Handbook of the social
mind. London: Routledge.
Pronin, E., Gilovich, T., & Ross, L. (2004). Objectivity in the
eye of the beholder: Divergent perceptions of bias in self
versus others. Psychological Review, 111(3), 781–799.
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot:
Perceptions of bias in self versus others. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(3), 369–381.
Reeder, G. D., & Coovert, M. D. (1986). Revising an impres-
sion of morality. Social Cognition, 4(1), 1–17.
Riis, J., Simmons, J. P., & Goodwin, G. P. (2008). Preferences
for enhancement pharmaceuticals: The reluctance to en-
hance fundamental traits. Journal of Consumer Research,
35(3), 495–508.
Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist’s view
of psychology. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. (in press). Folk mereology is teleolog-
ical. Noûs. doi: 10.1111/nous.12123
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002). The misunderstood limits of
folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth. Cognitive
Science, 26(5), 521–562.
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity
dominance, and contagion. Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy Review, 5(4), 296–320.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory
and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social develop-
ment, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78.
Schimel, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2001).
Being accepted for who we are: Evidence that social vali-
dation of the intrinsic self reduces general defensiveness.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(1), 35–52.
Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., Arndt, J., & King, L. A. (2009).
Thine own self: True self-concept accessibility and mean-
ing in life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(2),
473–490.
Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., Davis, W. E., Hirsch, K. A., &
Smith, C. M. (2013). The dynamic interplay between per-
ceived true self-knowledge and decision satisfaction. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(3), 542–558.
Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., King, L. A., & Arndt, J. (2011).
Feeling like you know who you are: Perceived true self-
knowledge and meaning in life. Personality and Social Psy-
chology Bulletin, 37(6), 745–756.
Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., Rawsthorne, L. J., & Ilardi, B.
(1997). Trait self and true self: Cross-role variation in the
big-five personality traits and its relations with psycholog-
ical authenticity and subjective well-being. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 73(6), 1380–1393.
Sloan, M. M. (2007). The real self and inauthenticity: The
importance of self-concept anchorage for emotional expe-
riences in the workplace. Social Psychology Quarterly, 70(3),
305–318.
THE TRUE SELF 11
Sloman, S. A., Love, B. C., & Ahn, W.-K. (1998). Feature cen-
trality and conceptual coherence. Cognitive Science, 22(2),
189–228.
Sripada, C. S. (2010). The deep self model and asymmetries
in folk judgments about intentional action. Philosophical
Studies, 151(2), 159–176.
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral
self. Cognition, 131(1), 159–171.
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2015). Neurodegeneration
and identity. Psychological Science, 26(9), 1468–1479.
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2016). Psychopathy and the
moral self. (Unpublished manuscript.)
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979/2001). An integrative theory
of intergroup conflict. In M. A. Hogg & D. Abrams (Eds.),
Intergroup relations: Essential readings (pp. 94–109). New
York, NY: Psychology Press.
Tobia, K. P. (2016). Personal identity, direction of change, and
neuroethics. Neuroethics, 9(1), 37–43.
Turner, R. H. (1976). The real self: From institution to im-
pulse. American Journal of Sociology, 81(5), 989–1016.
West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (1997). The domain specificity
and generality of overconfidence: Individual differences
in performance estimation bias. Psychonomic Bulletin & Re-
view, 4(3), 387–392.
Wojciszke, B., Bazinska, R., & Jaworski, M. (1998). On
the dominance of moral categories in impression forma-
tion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(12), 1251–
1263.
Wojciszke, B., Brycz, H., & Borkenau, P. (1993). Effects of
information content and evaluative extremity on positiv-
ity and negativity biases. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 64(3), 327–335.
